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Requiem for Pennsylvania's Rule Against
Perpetuities?
Martha W Jordan*
I think the general consensus among the practitioners that prac-
tice in this area of law is that the rule against perpetuities is un-
derstood by few and can be explained by fewer yet. '
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act, inter alia, repeals the
rule against perpetuities, effective for interests created after De-
cember 31, 2006.2 Given the current trend in the law, repeal was
inevitable. Not, as indicated by the comment that precedes this
* Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; J.D., University of
Arizona; LL.M., University of Denver. My thanks and deep appreciation to Sara Miller,
Duquesne University College of Law Class of 2008, for her invaluable assistance.
1. Representative Craig A. Dally, H.R. Jour., 46-2006, Reg. Sess. 1746 (Pa. 2006).
2. S.B. 660, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) (codified at 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6107.1 (West. 2007)).
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article, because the lawyers who encounter it regularly do not un-
derstand it, 3 but because they understand it all too well. They
want to use perpetual dynasty trusts to permanently avoid the
generation skipping transfer tax. 4 The rule against perpetuities,
however, prohibits permanent avoidance of the generation skip-
ping transfer tax and curtails deferral of the tax beyond the perpe-
tuities period.
5
Although critics have decried the proliferation of perpetual
trusts and cautioned against the adverse effects of accumulating
wealth in perpetual trusts,6 states continue to repeal the rule out
of fear that inaction will result in the exodus of their trust busi-
ness. 7 Retention and attraction of trust business was clearly a
motivating factor behind Pennsylvania's repeal.
8
The purpose of this article is not to debate the wisdom of repeal-
ing the rule against perpetuities but to highlight two arcane prob-
lems created by the repeal. Both of these problems derive from
the interaction of the doctrine of relation back with powers of ap-
pointments. The doctrine of relation back deems the exercise of a
special or a testamentary general power of appointment as the
completion of an act begun by the donor when the power was cre-
ated. 9 Consequently, the perpetuities period for contingent inter-
ests created by the exercise of a special or a testamentary general
power of appointment begins when the donor creates the power,
not when the donee exercises it. 10
The first question addressed by this article is whether the doc-
trine of relation back makes the rule against perpetuities applica-
ble to contingent interests resulting from the exercise of a special
or a testamentary general power of appointment created prior to,
but exercised after, the effective date of the repeal. This article
concludes there is no definitive answer to this question and sug-
gests that savvy practitioners circumvent the question whenever
3. In fact, the recommendation to repeal Pennsylvania's rule against perpetuities did
not come from the Advisory Committee on Decedents' Estates Law. See infra note 43.
4. See Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87
TAX NOTES 569, 572 (2000); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual
Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003).
5. See infra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
7. Bloom, supra note 4 at 572.
8. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
9. In re Boyd's Estate, 49 A. 297 (Pa. 1901); Estate of Lawrence, 20 A. 521 (Pa. 1890);
see also In re Grubb's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1939). See also infra notes 101-103 and
accompanying text.
10. Estate of Lawrence, 20 A. 521 (Pa. 1890). See also Grubb's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 1.
Summer 2008 Requiem for Pennsylvania's RAP?
possible by exercising the power to create the trust in a state that
has repealed the rule retroactively, as well as prospectively."
This article also suggests that the Pennsylvania legislature revisit
the reasons, if any, for making the repeal prospective and, either
clarify whether the rule continues to apply to contingent interests
created by the exercise of special or general testamentary powers
created prior to the repeal or, absent compelling reasons to the
contrary, make the repeal retroactive, at least with respect to tes-
tamentary general powers. 12
The second question addressed by this article concerns the im-
pact of the repeal on the estate and gift tax consequences to the
donee of a special power of appointment. Generally speaking, the
donee of a special power of appointment is not taxed on the value
of the appointive property. 13 An exception to the general rule,
called the "Delaware tax trap," taxes the donee of a special power
of appointment on the value of the appointive property if the
donee exercises the power to create another power of appointment,
unless the perpetuities period for determining the validity of any
contingent interests created by the second power is determined by
reference to the creation of the first power. 14
Because Pennsylvania repealed the rule against perpetuities
without substituting the prohibition on the power to suspend
alienation, the exercise of a special power of appointment to create
another power of appointment triggers the Delaware tax trap.
After discussing various possible legislative solutions to this prob-
lem, this article recommends the adoption of a perpetuities period
applicable to successive powers that begins at the creation of the
first power as the most viable solution. 15
II. RISE AND FALL OF PENNSYLVANIA'S RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
A. History of Pennsylvania's Rule
The rule against perpetuities has been law since the Duke of
Norfolk's Case 16 in the 1 7 th Century. The most commonly ac-
cepted modern formulation of the common law rule remains the
11. See infra notes 111-146 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
13. I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(1),(2), 2514(a),(b) (2000).
14. Id. §§ 2041(a)(3), 2514(d).
15. See infra notes 147-164 and accompanying text.
16. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 21 Eng. Rep. 665.
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one given by John Chipman Gray: "No interest is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest."'
17
The rule against perpetuities invalidates contingent future in-
terests that are too remote.' 8 Remoteness has nothing to do with
the likelihood that a contingent interest will or will not become
possessory, but rather with how long the interest may remain con-
tingent. To be valid, a contingent interest must vest, or fail to
vest, within the perpetuities period. 19 If an instrument creates
multiple interests, all interests violating the rule against perpe-
tuities are stricken from the conveyance; 20 however, as a general
rule, all valid interests take effect.
21
The rule's timely vesting requirement is mercilessly applied to
class gifts, where an all-or-nothing rule holds sway. 22 A class gift
is void unless the interest of each class member vests, or fails to
vest, in a timely manner, which means that a class gift stands
only if the class closes and all conditions precedent are satisfied
within the perpetuities period.23 If one member's interest violates
the rule, the entire class gift is stricken, and the interests of all
class members, even those certain to vest in a timely fashion, are
void. 24
The common law rule applies a prospective, what-might-happen
test, to determine remoteness. 25 A contingent interest offends the
common law rule if, at the time the interest is created, there is the
slightest possibility that the interest might still be contingent af-
ter the close of the perpetuities period, the infamous life in being
plus twenty-one years. 26 This test for remoteness takes into ac-
count all possible, and quite a few highly improbable, future sce-
17. 1 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 2002). For
a Pennsylvania recitation of this rule, see Warren's Estate, 182 A. 396 (Pa. 1936).
18. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 639 (1938).
19. Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1895
(1986).
20. Id.
21. Id. The exception to this is the doctrine of infectious invalidity, which invalidates
the entire conveyance if the court determines that the transferor would prefer total failure
to partial implementation of her dispositive plan. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1895. A class gift is valid only if the class closes and all conditions precedent
are resolved with respect to all members of the class within the perpetuities period. Id. at
1892. A class closes when all members of the class are ascertained. Id.
24. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1891.
25. Id. at 1869.
26. Id. A contingent interest guaranteed to vest or fail to vest within 21 years is valid
even though there is no associated measuring life. Id.
Vol. 46558
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narios. 27 The slightest possibility that vesting might be delayed
until after the perpetuities period expires makes the interest void
ab initio.28 The common law rule demands certainty: a contingent
interest is valid only if it is certain to vest or to be destroyed
within the perpetuities period.
29
The common law rule against perpetuities has been the subject
of much scholarly criticism.30 Two of its most frequently excori-
ated features are the possibilities test, which frequently invali-
dates interests based on "a chain of events [that] will almost cer-
tainly not happen,"31 and the calculation of the perpetuities pe-
riod, which necessitates identifying the life or lives in being that
establish the perpetuities period for a particular interest. 32
In 1947, Pennsylvania became the first state to replace the
common law rule with the wait-and-see rule against perpetuities
("wait-and-see"). 33  Wait-and-see replaces the possibilities test
with an actualities test, one that waits until the perpetuities pe-
riod ends and then determines whether the contingent interests
have, in fact, vested or been destroyed. 34 Only interests that re-
main contingent at the expiration of the perpetuities period are
27. Two of the more notorious possibilities are the "fertile octogenarian" and the "un-
born widow." The "fertile octogenarian" refers to the law's "conclusive presumption of life-
time fertility." Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718, 1729
(1983) (citing Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787)). For a Pennsylvania
reference, see Coggins Appeal, 16 A. 579 (Pa. 1889). The "unborn widow" refers to the law's
assumption that one may marry someone not yet born. Waggoner, supra at 1741. For a
Pennsylvania reference, see Disston's Estate, 46 D. & C. 496 (Pa. 1942), affd 36 A.2d 457
(Pa. 1944). For further discussion of improbable scenarios, see Dukeminier, supra note 19,
at 1876-80.
28. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1869. As a general rule, only the offending interest
is invalidated; however, a court may use the doctrine of infectious invalidity to void the
entire conveyance if the offending interest was essential to the donor's dispositive plan. Id.
at 1896.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952).
31. See Waggoner, supra note 27, at 1726.
32. See Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1710 (1985).
33. Act of Apr. 24, 1947, No. 39, § 4, 1947 Pa. Laws 100 (codified at 20 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 301.4-301.5 (West 1950)). See Donald S. Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-And-See Perpe-
tuity Doctrine - New Kernels from Old Nutshells, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 321 (1955). Wait-and-see
was considered a quite controversial development in the evolution of the rule against per-
petuities. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1124 (1960); Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and
See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179 (1952). For a further discussion of the debate, see
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1306-1307.
34. See Cohan, supra note 33, at 321.
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invalidated. 35 Although Pennsylvania adopted wait-and-see, it
retained the common law perpetuities period.36
Both the common law rule and wait-and-see invalidate any con-
tingent interest that does not vest or fail during the perpetuities
period. Because the common law rule evaluates interests based on
the mere possibility that vesting might be delayed beyond the
permitted period, it invalidates many interests that will, in fact,
vest within the requisite time period. Wait-and-see eliminates
this problem by only invalidating contingent interests that actu-
ally vest too remotely. The difference in how the two approaches
work is shown by the following example.
Grandfather dies survived by Son. Grandfather's will devises
his property to Son for life, then to his grandchildren who
reach age twenty-five. Under the common law, the class gift
to the grandchildren is invalid due the possibility that Son
might have a child who will not turn twenty-five until more
than twenty-one years after Son's death.37 Under wait-and-
see, the class gift to the grandchildren is valid unless there is
a grandchild who does in fact turn twenty-five more than
twenty-one years after Son's death.
On July 7, 2006, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Penn-
sylvania Uniform Trust Act, which, inter alia, repealed Pennsyl-
vania's rule against perpetuities for interests created after De-
cember 31, 2006.38 Pennsylvania's rule against perpetuities con-
tinues to apply to interests created before January 1, 2007.39
35. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West 2007).
36. Id. Immediately prior to its repeal, Pennsylvania's rule against perpetuities read
as follows: "Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events, any interest not then
vested and any interest in members of a class the membership of which is then subject to
increase shall be void." Id. Pennsylvania also changed the rules applicable to incomplete
dispositions of property. If, as a result of the application of the rule against perpetuities,
there is an incomplete disposition of the property, Pennsylvania law, as a general rule,
vests title in the holder of the last valid interest, rather than creating a reversion in favor
of the grantor. Id. § 6105.
37. SeeAppeal of Coggin, 16 A. 579 (Pa. 1889).
38. S.B. 660, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6107.1 (West 2007).
39. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 107.1(a) (West 2007). The legislature simultaneously
repealed the rule against excessive income accumulations by trusts, thereby removing all
impediments to the concentration of wealth and power in a trust. Id.
560 Vol. 46
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B. Explaining the Fall of the Rule
The original raison d'6tre for the rule against perpetuities, fos-
tering the alienation of land, has been largely superseded. 40 Mod-
ern scholars typically refer to the prevention of dead hand control
when defending the rule's continued existence. 41 Another modern
justification is curtailing the use of trusts "to protect wealthy
beneficiaries from bankruptcies and creditors, decrease the
amount of risk capital available for economic development, and...
tie up the family in disadvantageous and undesirable arrange-
ments."
4 2
The rule against perpetuities is not being repealed because it
lacks societal utility.43 Nor is it being repealed because those law-
yers who confront it most frequently are incapable of understand-
ing it.44 Professor Ira Mark Bloom, who has studied the repeal
movement since it began in 1997, 45 has concluded that the real
impetus behind the repeal movement is avoidance of the federal
generation skipping transfer ("GST") tax.46 According to Professor
Bloom, "[t]he rule is being repealed so that wealthy individuals
40. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1868; Bloom, supra note 4, at 570. Now that trusts
are the almost universal means of creating future interests, alienability is not a concern;
the trustee, as holder of legal title, has the power to alienate the trust corpus. Bloom, su-
pra note 4, at 570.
41. Dukeminier, supra note 32, at 1710. Professor Lewis Simes, for example, defended
the rule's role in preventing dead hand control by saying the rule "strikes a fair balance"
between the wishes of the living and the dead regarding the use and disposition of property
while allowing the living, rather than the dead, to control the "wealth of the world." LEWIS
M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58-59 (1955).
42. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1869.
43. The Advisory Committee on Decedents' Estates recommended retaining Pennsyl-
vania's rule against perpetuities but amending the perpetuities period to substitute a 150-
year period for the common law period of a life in being plus 21 years. See The General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission, THE
PENNSYLVANIA UNIFORM TRUST ACT (Proposed Official Draft 2005) and AMENDMENTS TO THE
PROBATE, ESTATES AND FIDUCIARIES CODE 138 (April 2005),
http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/UTC%204%202005.pdf.
44. The estate planning bar has mastered the rule against perpetuities to such an
extent that it routinely develops ways, such as perpetuities savings clauses, to minimize
the risk that the rule will interfere with a well-crafted estate plan. Estate planners who
commit malpractice because of the rule against perpetuities are most likely to be those who
engage in estate planning infrequently, not specialists. See Leach, supra note 33, at 1134.
The removal of the rule can be viewed as creating a level playing field for testators who
consult with a non-specialist. Id. On the other hand, one might argue that an unintended
benefit of the rule is dissuading casual estate planners from engaging in a practice area in
which they lack competence.
45. In 1997, the repeal movement began when Alaska unsuccessfully tried to repeal its
rule against perpetuities. Ira Mark Bloom, The Death of the "Death Tax'?: How Federal
Transfer Taxes Affect the Development of Property Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 673
(2000).
46. Bloom, supra note 4, at 569.
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will be able to create perpetual dynasty trusts to exploit the GST
tax system."
47
Prior to 1986, when the GST tax was enacted, there were three
states that had repealed the rule against perpetuities. 48 Yet, per-
petual trusts were virtually unheard of 49 Once the perpetual dy-
nasty trust movement began, states felt compelled to repeal the
rule or suffer the migration of their residents' wealth to perpetual
dynasty trusts domiciled in those states that had repealed the
rule.50 Banks and other professional fiduciaries added to the pres-
sure by advertising their perpetual dynasty trust business outside
their states' borders. 51 Consequently, states repeal the rule in
order to keep the perpetual dynasty trust business of their resi-
dents and in order to attract the perpetual dynasty trust business
of residents of states retaining the rule. 52
Remarks made by Representative Stephen Maitland endorsing
the Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act support the validity of Pro-
fessor Bloom's conclusions, at least as pertains to Pennsylvania's
reasons for repealing the rule.53 Representative Maitland said he
could "attest that this is an excellent product that will help attract
trust business to Pennsylvania. Trust funds are highly movable.
They flow to States that have repealed the rule against perpetui-
ties."5
4
Professor Bloom, the leading critic of the repeal movement, has
more than adequately stated the consequences of repeal. 55 The
advantages include creation and retention of trust business and
the elimination of complexity. 56 The primary disadvantage is the
removal of the rule's prohibition on perpetual trusts. 57 The crea-
tion of perpetual trusts, particularly ones that evade the transfer
47. Id. See pages 569-70 for a discussion of the GST tax and perpetual dynasty trusts.
See also Mary L. Fellows, Why the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual
Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511 (2006).
48. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1315.
49. Id.
50. Bloom, supra note 4, at 572.
51. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1316.
52. Id.
53. H.R. Jour., 46-2006, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). The repeal, however, is not limited to
perpetual dynasty trusts. It encompasses all interests previously subject to the rule and
authorizes the creation of perpetual trusts for any purpose.
54. Id. Representative Maitland also submitted to the record A Model Law for the
Repeal against [sic] Perpetuities (Dec. 2005), a paper he had written in law school arguing
for the repeal of the rule. Id. at 1746.
55. Bloom, supra note 4, at 574-76.
56. Id. at 571-72.
57. Id. at 574.
562 Vol. 46
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tax system, will eventually result in the greater concentration of
wealth and its inevitable corollary, power, in the hands of dynastic
families. 58 Furthermore, because these trusts bypass the transfer
tax system, the federal Fiske will be depleted, forcing Congress to
look for new ways to raise revenue.5 9 This search is bound to re-
sult in new taxes, a reallocation of the tax burden and, possibly,
even a total repeal of the GST exemption. 60 Furthermore, the ex-
istence of perpetual trusts will increase the power of the financial
services industry. 61 Banks and other corporate trustees who man-
age these trusts will determine how their wealth is employed.
62
And, since professional trustees are notoriously risk adverse, a
reduction in the available sources of risk capital is likely.
63
III. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, THE GENERATION SKIPPING
TRANSFER TAX, AND DYNASTY TRUSTS
The federal estate tax taxes gratuitous transfers other than
those to a spouse or a charity.64 As the transfer tax system is in-
tended to reach only the wealthiest taxpayers, each person has an
exemption. 65 For taxpayers dying in 2007 or 2008, the estate tax
exemption is $2 million; for taxpayers dying in 2009, $3.5 mil-
lion.66
The estate tax achieves its intended purpose of taxing the
transmission of wealth from one generation to the next quite well
so long as property passes directly from one generation to the
next; however, because the estate tax only reaches property in-
cluded in a testator's estate, it is ill-equipped to tax temporal divi-
sions of wealth. When a grantor transfers property to a trust
benefiting multiple generations, the resulting "mere shifts in in-
58. Id. at 575. If the corpus of a perpetual dynasty trust originally funded with $2
million grows at an average rate of five percent, compounded annually, after taking into
account income tax, distributions, mismanagement, and market fluctuations, in 100 years
the trust will hold over $250 million. See Ira Mark Bloom, Transfer Tax Avoidance: The
Impact of Perpetuities Restrictions Before and After Generation-Skipping Taxation, 45 ALB.
L. REV. 260, 301 n.219 (1981).





64. I.R.C. §§ 2055(a), 2056(a) (2000). The federal gift tax mirrors the estate tax and
prevents circumvention of the estate tax by taxing inter vivos transfers that deplete a do-
nor's gross estate. Id.
65. Id. §§ 2010, 2505. The exemption is called the unified credit or applicable credit
amount. Id. § 2010.
66. Id. § 2010(c).
563
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terests such as occur upon distributions from an existing trust to a
beneficiary or upon the termination of a trust or a trust benefici-
ary's interest" escape the reaches of the estate tax. 67 Until 1986,
when Congress enacted the GST tax, estate planners routinely
used life estates to circumvent the estate tax. 68 Although the ini-
tial transfer to the life tenant and remainderman was subject to
estate tax, when the life tenant died, the property would pass to
the remainderman free from the imposition of estate tax.69
The GST tax closes this loophole by taxing shifts in beneficial
interests, such as those that occur when a life tenant dies and the
next generation's remainder interest becomes the present interest
or when a trust terminates and distributes its corpus to the re-
maindermen. 70 Furthermore, the GST tax reaches the property at
the time of the shift, which means that any appreciation in the
value subsequent to the testator's death is subject to tax. 71
The GST tax is a punitive tax, designed to discourage significant
generation skipping transfers by the wealthiest class of society, 72
the class with sufficient wealth to limit a generation's inheritance
to the income derived from property without adversely impacting
its lifestyle. Like the estate tax, the GST tax grants every tax-
payer an exemption. Currently, the GST exemption and the es-
tate tax exemption are equal. 73 For decedents dying in 2007 and
67. RICHARD B. STEPHENS, ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & Git TAXATION § 1.04(1) (1991).
68. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1312.
69. Id.
70. I.R.C. §§ 2611(a)(1),(a)(2), 2612(a),(b) (2000). The GST tax reaches a shift in inter-
est even if the trust continues, id. §§ 2611(a)(2), 2612(a)(1), or simply makes a distribution
to a skip person. Id. § 2621(a). The GST also taxes direct transfers of property that skip
the next succeeding generation. Id. § 2612(c).
71. Id. §§ 2621(a)(1), 2622(a)(1). The GST is equally applicable to trusts created by
inter vivos transfer; however, for simplicity this article will assume that all trusts are cre-
ated in the testator's will. Perpetual dynasty trusts created during 2007, 2008, or 2009 are
most likely to be testamentary because, during those years, the GST exemption for testa-
mentary transfers is greater than the GST exemption for inter vivos transfers.
72. The punitive nature of the GST tax is amply demonstrated by its tax rate. The
GST tax rate is a flat rate equal to the maximum federal estate tax rate. I.R.C. § 2641(a)(1)
(2000). Unlike the estate tax or the gift tax, there are no lower brackets. See id. § 2001(c).
The applicable rate, however, may be lower because of the operation of the inclusion ratio.
Id. §§ 2641(a)(2), 2642. See infra note 76.
73. For many years the GST tax targeted only the top strata of taxpayers subject to
estate and gift tax. Until 2002, the amount of the exemption for the GST tax exceeded that
for the estate and gift tax. Compare I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000) prior to amendment by the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521(a),
115 Stat. 38 (2001), and I.R.C. § 2631(c) (2000) prior to amendment by The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521(c), 115 Stat. 38,
(2001).
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2008, the GST exemption equals $2 million, for those dying in
2009, $3.5 million.
74
Testators are permitted to allocate their GST exemption among
their generation skipping transfers. 75 As long as the amount of
the exemption allocated to a transfer equals the amount of the
transfer, the transfer completely escapes the GST tax. 76 More im-
portantly, if the transfer is to a trust, as long as the amount trans-
ferred to the trust does not exceed the GST exemption allocated to
the trust, the GST tax will never apply to the trust or to any shift
in beneficial interest or distribution from the trust, regardless of
how much the corpus of the trust appreciates.
77
Perpetual dynasty trusts exploit that aspect of the GST exemp-
tion that permanently shelters a trust from application of the GST
tax, so long as sufficient GST exemption is allocated to the trust.
The most efficient use of a taxpayer's GST exemption is to create a
perpetual dynasty trust that will run as long as the law permits
and then fund it with an amount equal to the taxpayer's GST ex-
emption. 7
8
The ideal perpetual dynasty trust looks something like the fol-
lowing: income to my children for life, then income to my grand-
children for life, then income to my great-grandchildren for life,
and so forth for as long as the testator has descendants living with
a gift over to charity or some other designated beneficiary if all of
the testator's descendants die. 79 Obviously, the rule against per-
petuities foils this objective by limiting the number of life estates
that can be tacked onto the sequence. Regardless of whether the
common law rule or wait-and-see applies, the number of genera-
tions that can hold life interests in the trust is going to be lim-
74. I.R.C. §§ 2631(a), 2010(c) (2000). The GST exemption for inter vivos transfers dur-
ing these years is $1 million. Id. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c), 2505(a)(1) (2000).
75. Id. § 2631(a).
76. Id. §§ 2602, 2641(a), 2642(a)(1),(2). The GST tax is calculated by multiplying the
value of the property transferred by the applicable rate, id. § 2602, which is defined as the
product of the maximum federal estate tax rate and the inclusion ratio with respect to the
particular transfer. Id. § 2641(a). The inclusion ratio depends on the amount of a tax-
payer's GST exemption allocated to a particular transfer. Id. § 2642(a)(2). If the GST ex-
emption allocated to a transfer equals the value of the property transferred, the inclusion
ratio is zero. I.R.C. § 2642(a)(1) (2000). If the GST exemption allocated to a transfer is less
than the value of the property transferred, the inclusion ratio will equal the percentage of
the value of the property transferred sheltered by the GST exemption. Id. Once estab-
lished, the inclusion ratio remains fixed and applies to all future shifts in interest. Id.
77. Id. §§ 2602, 2641(a), 2642(a)(1),(2).




ited.80 Eliminating the rule's constraining force frees testators to
create perpetual dynasty trusts that last as long as the testators'
lineal lines.81
IV. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT: THE BANCO'S GHOST OF
PENNSYLVANIA'S RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES?
A. Powers of Appointment and the Rule Against Perpetuities
A power of appointment, whether general or special, presently
exercisable or testamentary, gives the donee of the power author-
ity to dispose of a property interest owned by another. 82 A power
is general, as opposed to special, if the power can be exercised in
favor of the donee, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the
creditors of the donee's estate.83 A power is presently exercisable
if the donee may exercise it currently by deed,8 4 and testamentary
if the donee may only exercise it in her will.85
The rule against perpetuities invalidates powers of appointment
that can be exercised too remotely and assesses the validity of con-
tingent interests created by the exercise of a valid power. 86 For
purposes of applying the rule against perpetuities to either the
creation or the exercise of a power of appointment, the law differ-
entiates between presently exercisable general powers of ap-
pointment and special or testamentary general powers. 87 This
distinction is predicated on the greater power granted to the donee
of a presently exercisable power. Since all that stands between
the donee of a presently exercisable power and outright ownership
of the appointive property is "the stroke of a pen," the law treats
the donee of a presently exercisable general power as the owner of
the appointive property.8 8 Donees of special powers and general
testamentary powers cannot enjoy the property in their own right;
80. See supra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
81. Bloom, supra note 4, at 574.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.1 (1986).
83. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 320(1)-(2) (1940); I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) (2000). For the tax
treatment of powers of appointment, see infra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
84. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 321(2) (1940).
85. Id. § 321(1). A presently exercisable power may also be exercisable by will. Rich-
ard R. B. Powell, Powers of Appointment, 10 BROOK. L. REv. 233, 238 (1940).
86. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1901. See also Laurence M. Jones, The Rule Against
Perpetuities and Powers of Appointment: An Old Controversy Revived, 54 IOWA L. REV. 456,
458 (1968).
87. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1901.
88. Id.
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they can only fill in the blank on the donor's gift of the appointive
property.8 9
The creation of a power of appointment violates the rule against
perpetuities if the power, a contingent interest subject to the rule,
can be exercised too remotely. 90 The creation of a power of ap-
pointment satisfies the rule only if the donee must exercise the
power within the perpetuities period.91 In the case of a general
power, this requirement is satisfied so long as the power is certain
to become presently exercisable within the perpetuities period. 92
A power of appointment may be valid under the rule against per-
petuities even though its terms permit the donee to make an inva-
lid appointment. 9
3
When these rules are applied to powers subject to the wait-and-
see rule against perpetuities, the results can be summarized as
follows. A special power or a testamentary power of appointment
is invalid unless it is exercised within the perpetuities period. 94 A
general power, however, is valid, even though the donee fails to
exercise it within the perpetuities period, as long as it become
presently exercisable by the expiration of the perpetuities pe-
riod. 95
The rule against perpetuities also invalidates remote contingent
interests created by the exercise of a power of appointment. 96
When evaluating the validity of interests created by the exercise
of a power of appointment, the law draws the same distinction
between special or general testamentary powers and presently
exercisable general powers. 97 The distinction determines when
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1902.
91. Id.
92. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1902.
93. In re Warren's Estate, 182 A. 396 (Pa. 1936).
94. Cohan, supra note 33, at 339. See also Jones, supra note 86, at 458.
95. Jones, supra note 86, at 458.
96. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1901-05; Jones, supra note 86, at 459-60.
97. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1901. As a general rule, if an appointment is invalid,
the appointive property passes to the takers in default, if any. Id. at 1903. In the absence
of takers in default the common law directed the appointive property back to the donor or
the donor's estate. Id. Pennsylvania, however, has modified this rule by statute. See PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (West 2007). The doctrine of capture, however, may pull the ap-
pointive property into the donee's estate if the donee invalidly exercises a general power in
such a manner as to indicate the donee's intent to assume control of the appointive prop-
erty for all purposes, not merely for purposes of appointing it a third party. Dukeminier,
supra note 19, at 1904. The most common method for a donee to capture the appointive
property is to blend the appointive property with the property included in the donee's es-
tate. Id. This is usually done by incorporating the exercise of the power into a clause that
also disposes of the donee's own property. Id.
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the perpetuities period begins-at the time the donee exercises the
power or at the time that the donor created the power. 98
Settled law applies the doctrine of relation back to the exercise
of a special99 or a general testamentary power of appointment.100
According to the doctrine, "the exercise of a power of appointment
'relates back' to the instrument creating the power." 101 The donee
is viewed as the agent of the donor, completing a gift that was be-
gun by the donor when the power was created; 10 2 the person to
whom the appointment is made takes his title as though the crea-
tion of the power and its exercise were effectuated by the same
instrument. 0 3  The doctrine of relation back also controls when
the perpetuities period begins with respect to interests created by
the exercise of a special power 10 4 or a testamentary general
power;10 5 the perpetuities period begins when the donor creates
the power, not when the donee exercises it.106 As a result, any
contingent interest created by the exercise of a special or a testa-
mentary general power of appointment is valid only if it vests or
fails during a life in being plus twenty-one years measured from
the time the donor created the power of appointment.
98. Dukeminier, supra note 19, at 1901; Jones, supra note 86, at 459-60.
99. In re Boyd's Estate, 49 A. 297 (Pa. 1901). See also Jones, supra note 86, at 40.
100. Appeal of Mifflin, 15 A. 525, 527 (Pa. 1888). See also Dukeminier, supra note 19, at
1902-03; Jones, supra note 86, at 459-60.
101. In re Estate of Frank E. Moore, 283 A.2d 50, 53, 54 (Pa. 1971) (citing Barton's
Trust, 35 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1944); Huddy's Estate, 84 A. 909 (Pa. 1912); Commonwealth v.
William's Executors, 13 Pa. 29 (1850)).
102. Boyd's Estate, 49 A. 297; In re Grubb's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1939); See also
Jones, supra note 86, at 40.
103. Estate of Frank E. Moore, 445 Pa. 17 (citing Barton's Trust, 35 A.2d 266; Huddy's
Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 A. 909 (1912); William's Executors, 13 Pa. 29; and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 20.1 (1986). "The donee of a power of appoint-
ment is acting for the donor to complete a transfer made by the donor"). Id.
A similar philosophy is apparent in Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, which taxes the value
of appointive property in the estate of the donor, rather than the donee, of the power. 72
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9111(k), 9116(f) (West 2000). For inheritance purposes, however,
Pennsylvania does not distinguish between presently exercisable general powers and other
powers. Id.
104. Boyd's Estate, 49 A. 297; Mifflin, 15 A. 525, 527 (Pa. 1888). See also Dukeminier,
supra note 19, at 1902-03; Jones, supra note 86, at 40.
105. Mifflin, 15 A. at 527 (citing Gray, supra note 17, § 526(b)). Pennsylvania follows
the majority rule regarding the application of relation back to the exercise of powers of
appointment. Jones, supra note 86, at 463. But see Jones, supra note 86, at 461-469 for a
discussion of whether testamentary general powers should be accorded the same treatment
as presently exercisable general powers and exempted from the doctrine of relation back.
106. Although the perpetuities period begins when the donor creates the power, the
second look doctrine provides that circumstances existing at the time the power is exercised
are taken into account for purposes of determining the validity of any interests created by
the exercise of the power. In re Lewis' Estate, 37 A.2d 482 (Pa. 1944); Dukeminier, supra
note 19, at 1902-03.
Summer 2008 Requiem for Pennsylvania's RAP?
With respect to interests created by the exercise of a presently
exercisable general power of appointment, the perpetuities period
commences at the time the donee exercises the power, rather than
when the donor creates it. 107 This rule is consistent with the one
that treats the donee of a presently exercisable general power as
the owner of the appointive property. 08 The following example
illustrates the impact of the doctrine of relation back on the calcu-
lation of the perpetuities period for an interest created by the ex-
ercise of a power of appointment.
Example: Testator died in 1990, leaving a will that included a
power of appointment marital deduction trust giving Surviv-
ing Spouse a general power of appointment over the trust cor-
pus. Assume Testator and Surviving Spouse had one child,
Son. In 1995, Surviving Spouse remarried and gave birth to
Daughter. In 2006, Surviving Spouse exercises the power of
appointment to appoint the trust corpus to a trust with the
following terms: income to my children for life, then remain-
der to my grandchildren per stirpes. If Surviving Spouse's
power of appointment is a testamentary general power, the
perpetuities period for measuring the validity of the grand-
children's remainder interest is measured from 1990, when
Testator created the power of appointment. Consequently,
only Son, not Daughter, can serve as a measuring life. If,
however, Surviving Spouse's power of appointment is a pres-
ently exercisable general power of appointment, the perpetui-
ties period begins in 2006, when Surviving Spouse exercises
the power. Consequently, both Daughter and Son can serve as
measuring lives. Under wait-and-see, if the power is a pres-
ently exercisable general power, the grandchildren's remain-
der interest is valid regardless of whether Son or Daughter
dies last, but if the power is a testamentary general power,
the grandchildren's remainder interest is valid only if it vests
within twenty-one years of Son's death, which means that if
Daughter outlives Son, the remainder interest may turn out
to be invalid.
Pennsylvania has codified the rule for calculating the perpetui-
ties period for contingent interests created by the exercise of a
107. Mifflin, 15 A. at 527.
108. Id. See also Jones, supra note 86, at 460.
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presently exercisable general power of appointment, 0 9 but relies
on the common law to determine the commencement of the perpe-
tuities period for interests created by the exercise of a special or a
testamentary general power of appointment. 110
B. The Intersection of Powers of Appointment, the Doctrine of
Relation Back, and the Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Powers of appointment play an important role in estate plan-
ning, particularly in drafting marital deduction trusts. In a power
of appointment trust, for example, the surviving spouse must be
given a general power of appointment, either testamentary or
presently exercisable, over the corpus as a condition precedent to
obtaining the marital deduction."' Typically, a power of ap-
pointment trust limits the surviving spouse to a testamentary
general power if the testator wants to preserve the corpus of the
trust 112 or hopes to exert some control over the ultimate recipients
of the property." 3 For example, a power of appointment trust
might have the following terms: income to the surviving spouse for
109. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(c) (West 2007). The Pennsylvania Uniform Trust
Act limited application of this rule to interests created before January 1, 2007. Id. § 6107.1.
110. Id. § 6104(c) cmt. b (1947).
111. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(1), (b)(5) (2000). The surviving spouse's general power of ap-
pointment must be exercisable in favor of the surviving spouse or the surviving spouse's
estate. Id. § 2056(b)(5). The marital deduction is denied if the surviving spouse is given a
terminable interest. Id. § 2056(b)(1). A terminable interest exists if (i) the surviving
spouse's interest in the property is terminable; (ii) the decedent also transfers, or has trans-
ferred, an interest in the property to someone other than the surviving spouse; and (iii)
after the death of the surviving spouse, such other person may come into possession or
enjoyment of the property as a result of the interest received from the decedent. Id. The
terminable interest rule basically insures that a martial deduction gift will be included in
the surviving spouse's estate. With a power of appointment trust, the surviving spouse's
general power of appointment ensures inclusion of the trust corpus in the surviving
spouse's estate. Id. § 2041(a)(2).
112. Geoffrey P. Picket, Powers of Appointment as an Estate Planning Tool, 26 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1435, 1449 (1968).
113. Prior to enactment of the QTIP trust in 1981 testators who wanted to control the
ultimate disposition of their property had to choose between a power of appointment trust
with a testamentary general power or foregoing the marital deduction. A testamentary
general power was viewed as offering the testator some control on the theory that the sur-
viving spouse was less likely to exercise the power of appointment if it was testamentary.
Albert Mannheimer, Relative Merits of Two Kinds of Trusts that Qualify for the Martial
Deduction, 11 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 673, 684 (1953). It was hardly a foolproof solu-
tion, since the surviving spouse could exercise the general power of appointment to appoint
the property away from the takers in default. Id. A testator who was really adamant about
control could throw obstacles in the way to make it harder for the surviving spouse to exer-
cise the power, such as prohibiting a blanket exercise of the power and requiring, instead,
a specific reference to the power. Id. Once the QTIP trust was introduced, testators could
keep total control over the disposition of their estate without sacrificing the marital deduc-
tion. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B) (2000).
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life; testamentary general power of appointment to the surviving
spouse; and a gift over in default of appointment to the testator's
children, per stirpes.
A QTIP trust is another example of a marital deduction trust
that frequently grants the surviving spouse a power of appoint-
ment. 114 Although a power of appointment is unnecessary to qual-
ify a QTIP trust for the marital deduction, 1 5 QTIPs frequently
grant the surviving spouse a special testamentary power of ap-
pointment in favor of the remaindermen, typically the testator's
issue, to provide flexibility; 116 the surviving spouse can determine
whether events subsequent to the testator's death should affect
the division of the trust corpus among the remaindermen. 117 A
QTIP trust, for example, might include the following terms: in-
come to the surviving spouse for life; a special testamentary power
to the surviving spouse in favor of the testator's issue; and a gift
over in default of appointment to the testator's children per stir-
pes.
The above examples are by no means an exhaustive list of the
powers of appointment created prior to the repeal of the rule
against perpetuities that a practitioner may encounter post-
repeal. They do illustrate, as explained below, two of the most
likely situations in which a practitioner will be tempted to exercise
a special or a testamentary general power to create a perpetual
dynasty trust, raising the question of whether the interaction of
the doctrine of relation back with the effective date for the repeal
subjects the perpetual dynasty trust to the rule against perpetui-
ties.
Current estate tax law encourages the creation of a perpetual
dynasty trust by allowing the permanent removal of the trust cor-
pus from the transfer tax system. The amount that can be shel-
tered varies depending on the year of the testator's death. The
114. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (2000).
115. Id. § 2056(b)(7)(B). The trust must satisfy the requirements for qualified termina-
ble interest property, which essentially require that all income be paid to the surviving
spouse for life and that during the surviving spouse's life none of the trust corpus can be
distributed to anyone other than the surviving spouse. Id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(II). The dece-
dent's estate must make a QTIP election to claim the marital deduction with respect to
property transferred to the trust. Id. § 2056(b)(7). A power of appointment is unnecessary
since the QTIP election causes the property to be included in the surviving spouse's estate.
Id. § 2044(b)(1)(A). Consequently, testators who want total control over the ultimate dis-
tribution of their estates choose QTIP trusts over power of appointment trusts.




maximum amount is $2 million for testators who die in 2007 or
2008,118 $3.5 million for those who die in 2009.119 And, as long as
the money remains in the perpetual dynasty trust, any apprecia-
tion is also exempt from transfer tax. 120 Consequently, it is proba-
bly malpractice per se not to suggest a perpetual dynasty trust to
any client who can afford to fund one.
Many surviving spouses who should take advantage of a per-
petual dynasty trust have insufficient personal assets to fund the
trust; they derive their wealth, and their potential estate tax li-
ability, from a marital deduction trust. Consequently, their only
chance of funding a perpetual dynasty trust is to appoint property
from the marital deduction trust. This strategy works from a GST
tax perspective. Because the corpus of a marital deduction trust is
included in the surviving spouse's gross estate for estate tax pur-
poses, the surviving spouse is considered the transferor of the en-
tire corpus of the trust for GST tax purposes.121 Therefore, a sur-
viving spouse who has a power of appointment over the corpus of
the marital deduction trust can exercise that power to fund a per-
petual dynasty trust, regardless of whether the power is general
or special, presently exercisable or testamentary, and then allo-
cate her GST exemption to the trust to permanently shield the
corpus from estate, gift, or GST tax. 1
22
Appointing assets from the marital deduction trust to fund the
surviving spouse's perpetual dynasty trust is an obvious solution
in a situation where the surviving spouse's separate property is
insufficient. But, if the surviving spouse holds a special or a tes-
tamentary general power of appointment created prior to January
1, 2007, the effective date for the repeal of Pennsylvania's rule
against perpetuities, the question arises whether the doctrine of
relation back determines when the interests are created, as well
as the starting date for the perpetuities period by which the valid-
ity of such interests will be judged. Simply put, are contingent
118. I.R.C. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c) (2000).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
121. I.R.C. § 2652(a)(1) (2000). As a general rule, the donee of a special power is not
considered the transferor of the appointive property for purposes of the GST tax because
the value of the appointive property is not included in the donee's gross estate. Id. When a
surviving spouse holds a special power over the corpus of a QTIP trust, the value of the
appointive property, the trust corpus, is included in the surviving spouse's estate as a re-
sult of the QTIP election, without regard to the nature of the surviving spouse's power of
appointment. Id. § 2044.
122. Id. This assumes in the case of a special power that the perpetual dynasty trust is
a permissible appointee. Id. § 2652 (a)(1).
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interests created by the exercise of a special or a testamentary
general power of appointment created when the donee exercises
the power or when the donor creates the power? The theory un-
derlying the doctrine of relation back indicates that the interests
are created when the donor creates the power. 123 Further support
for the theory that the interests are created at the time the donor
creates the power, rather than when the donee exercises it, can be
found in the inheritance tax rules. Pennsylvania's inheritance tax
taxes the value of appointive property in the estate of the donor of
a power of appointment, not in the estate of the donee.124 If the
interests are created when the donor created the power, any inter-
ests created by the exercise of the power, including any contingent
interests in a perpetual dynasty trust created by the exercise or to
which the property is appointed, will be subject to the rule against
perpetuities. To the extent that a perpetual dynasty trust is sub-
ject to the rule against perpetuities, the trust's purpose, the per-
manent removal of the corpus from the estate tax base, will be
thwarted when the rule terminates the trust at the end of the per-
petuities period.
The question of how the doctrine of relation back interacts with
the effective date of a statute has risen before on slightly different
facts. In re Estate of Frank E. Moore125 considered whether a
charitable gift created by the exercise of a testamentary general
power qualified for an exemption to the inheritance tax applicable
to charitable transfers when the power of appointment was cre-
ated prior to, but exercised after, the effective date for the exemp-
tion. 126 Since the exemption applied to all "transfers" made after
the effective date, the court had to determine whether the transfer
to the charity occurred when the power was created or when it
was exercised. 1
27
The trial court held that the transfer occurred at the time the
power was created and, therefore, did not qualify for the exemp-
tion. 128 The first time the supreme court heard the case, an evenly
divided court affirmed. 129 The doctrine of relation back, a doctrine
"firmly embedded in Pennsylvania law,"'130 was the primary justi-
123. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
124. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9111(k), 9116(0 (West 2000). See supra note 103.
125. 283 A.2d 50 (Pa. 1971).
126. Moore, 283 A.2d at 51.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 52.
129. Id. at 54.
130. Id. at 55.
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fication cited by those justices who voted to affirm. 131 When the
case was reheard, a similarly divided court reversed itself and
held, four to two, that the transfer occurred after the effective date
of the exemption. 132
On rehearing, the majority was persuaded by the fact that the
charities, the eventual appointees, had no interest in the appoint-
ive property until the power was exercised, an act that occurred
after the effective date of the exemption. 133 The majority con-
cluded that there could be no transfer to the charities prior to the
time when they had some sort of legal or equitable interest in the
property. 134 The majority also concluded that its reading com-
ported with the purpose of the exemption and advanced Pennsyl-
vania's long-standing policy of encouraging donations to charity. 1
35
The majority in Moore did not definitively hold that the doctrine
of relation back would never be applied to determine if an ap-
pointment was made after the effective date of a statutory
change,136 although it did refer to the doctrine dismissively as "a
historical fiction."'137 Instead, the majority declined to use the doc-
trine "to reach a result opposite to that clearly suggested by both
the text and underlying policy of the exemption statute."'138 Con-
sequently, the doctrine of relation back remains settled law.
While one can argue that the holding in Moore mandates a simi-
lar conclusion regarding the interaction of powers of appointment
with the effective date of the repeal of the rule against perpetui-
ties, Moore is distinguishable. The issue in Moore was when the
"transfer" to the appointees occurred; 139 the issue with respect to
the repeal of the rule against perpetuities is when the contingent
131. Moore, 283 A.2d at 50.
132. Id. Only six members of the court heard either argument. The first time the ap-
peal was heard, Justices Cohen, Eagan, and O'Brien voted to affirm and Justices Roberts,
Bell, and Jones dissented. Id. at 54. In the interim between the first argument and the
rehearing, Justice Cohen died; he was replaced by Justice Barbieri. None of the justices
who heard both arguments changed their vote. The reason for the change in outcome was
the substitution of Justice Barbieri for Justice Cohen. Id.
133. Id. at 52. See also Bourne Estate, 69 Pa. D. & C.2d 591 (1974) (extending the hold-
ing of Moore to charitable appointments made pursuant to a special power of appointment
created prior to the effective date of the exemption from inheritance tax for charitable
transfers).
134. Moore, 283 A.2d at 52.
135. Id. at 52-53.
136. Id. at 53-54.
137. Id. at 54.
138. Id. The majority also concluded that there was a material difference between a
change in the tax rate and the creation of an exemption from tax. Id. at 53.
139. Moore, 283 A.2d at 52.
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interest given to the appointees is created.140 It may seem like
nitpicking to parse the issue this finely, but it is just this sort of
hairsplitting that has tripped up many a lawyer in the past.
The difference between when property is transferred and when
it is created is sufficient to prevent Moore from definitively an-
swering the question. One can argue that the justification offered
by the Moore court for its conclusion that the transfer occurred
after the effective date of the amendment, that there was no trans-
fer to the charities prior to the time when they had some sort of
legal or equitable interest in the property,' 4 ' supports the argu-
ment that the charities' interests were created at the time the
power was exercised. An equally plausible interpretation is that
the court is simply saying the interests, created at the time the
donor created the power of appointment, were not transferred to
the appointees until they had some legal or beneficial interest in
the property.
Even if accepted as the controlling authority, Moore offers, at
best, ambivalent support for the proposition that the interests are
created when the power is exercised. Moore stands for the propo-
sition that the doctrine of relation back is relevant to the question
of whether contingent interests are created before the effective
date of the a statute only if application of the doctrine is not re-
pugnant to the policies underlying the statute.142 One policy un-
derlying the repeal of the rule against perpetuities is the encour-
agement of perpetual trusts; however, the legislature explicitly
limited the repeal only to interests created after the effective date.
Either the doctrine of relation back controls, which means the in-
terests are created before the effective date and do not qualify for
the repeal, or it does not, which means the interests are created
after the effective date and qualify for the repeal. And, unlike the
situation in Moore, there is no long-standing policy of encouraging
perpetual trusts to counter balance the legislature's clear intent
that perpetual trusts can only be created, and funded with inter-
ests created, after the effective date of the repeal.
Putting Moore aside, indirect support for the argument that the
repeal does not apply to interests created by the exercise of powers
created before the effective date of the repeal can be found in the
settled expectations of donors and donees. As long as the doctrine
of relation back and the rule against perpetuities are in effect, the
140. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107.1 (West 2007).




exercise of a special power of appointment is a nontaxable event to
the donee.143 Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that many
special powers created prior to the effective date of the repeal au-
thorize the creation of successive powers. Making the repeal ret-
roactive prevents the exercise of those powers in the manner con-
templated by the donor without adverse tax consequences to the
donee. 144 In the case of special powers, making the repeal retroac-
tive creates a trap for the unwary donee or, to be more precise, the
unwary lawyer advising the donee.
To summarize, the question of whether the rule against perpe-
tuities applies to contingent interests created by the exercise of a
special or general testamentary power created prior to, but exer-
cised after, the effective date for the repeal of Pennsylvania's rule
against perpetuities remains open. Moore provides an argument
that such interests are not subject to the rule against perpetuities,
but can one afford to dismiss the question, the doctrine of relation
back, and the rule against perpetuities, when exercising a special
or general testamentary power created prior January 1, 2007? For
estate planners, the answer is no for some very pragmatic reasons.
First, as explained above, current law encourages the exercise of
powers of appointment created prior to the repeal of the rule to
create interests that vest beyond the time period permitted by the
rule against perpetuities. So, many estate planners will eventu-
ally face a situation that raises the question.
Second, the consequences of gambling, and losing, are catastro-
phic. Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the question, the
prudent estate planner will not risk the possibility that a perpet-
ual dynasty trust will be terminated by the rule against perpetui-
ties and the trust corpus returned to the transfer tax system. Par-
ticularly since, under wait-and-see, the question will probably not
be raised until sometime in the distant future when the value of
the perpetual dynasty trust may have multiplied exponentially.
Wait-and-see increases the potential value of the trust at the time
that the issue is raised and, if the prognostications of Professor
Bloom and others are correct, the chances that there may be a
change in attitude towards the repeal of the rule at the time the
issue is raised. If the repeal results in the predicted concentration
143. See infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 156-158 and accompanying text. Some states have explicitly limited
the repeal of the rule to special powers created after the effective date of repeal to avoid
this problem. See e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.025-3(1) (West 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-
2005(9) (LexisNexis 2007).
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of wealth in perpetual trusts, there may be a backlash; a reform-
minded court may seize on any excuse to reduce the amount of
wealth controlled by perpetual trusts. 1
45
Third, current law offers an easy way to circumvent the entire
problem, so why gamble? The prudent estate planner will avoid
the potential problem entirely, especially since the problem can be
circumvented without foregoing funding of the perpetual dynasty
trust. The easy solution is to appoint the property to a perpetual
dynasty trust domiciled in a state that has repealed the rule
against perpetuities with respect to all interests and not just with
respect to interests created after a certain date; 146 however, if the
power is a special power of appointment, practitioners should
mind the Delaware tax trap, discussed below.
V. THE DELAWARE TAX TRAP
The other possible problem created by the repeal of Pennsyl-
vania's rule against perpetuities concerns the estate and gift tax
treatment of property subject to a special power of appointment.
The problem arises because of a recondite provision in the estate
and gift tax, enacted to prevent circumvention of the transfer tax
system by the use of successive special powers of appointment.
Special powers of appointment are frequently included in trusts
to create flexibility.147 For example, the donee of a special power
may be given the authority to sprinkle income or to modify trust
terms. 148 Because a corporate trustee is unlikely to sacrifice its
trustee's fees by voluntarily terminating a trust and because judi-
cial termination is both doubtful and costly, special powers may be
used to give one or more of the trust beneficiaries the authority to
terminate the trust. 149 In some perpetual trusts, successive spe-
cial powers are used as the device that transfers enjoyment of the
trust corpus from one generation to the next. 150 For example, each
successive income beneficiary may be given a special power of ap-
145. One possible impetus for a future backlash may be that the corpus of a perpetual
dynasty trust is also removed from Pennsylvania's inheritance tax base. 72 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9107, 9113 (West 2000).
146. For example, the rule against perpetuities has no effect in New Jersey. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West 2007). Ohio explicitly extends its repeal to any general power exer-
cised after the effective date of its repeal. OHIo RE v. CODE ANN. § 2131.09(B)(3)(c) (West
2007).
147. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1332.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1332-33.
150. Id. at 1318.
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pointment authorizing the beneficiary to appoint the portion of the
trust corpus generating that beneficiary's share of trust income in
further trust for the benefit of the beneficiary's spouse and de-
scendants. 
151
The estate and gift tax system distinguishes between general
and special powers when determining the tax consequences to the
donee of the power.152 The donee of a general power of appoint-
ment must include the value of the appointive property in her
gross estate, regardless of whether the power is exercised or
not.153 Similarly, the donee of a general power is treated as mak-
ing a taxable gift if the donee exercises the power during life.
154
The donee of a special power of appointment, on the other hand, is
not, as a general rule, taxed on the value of the appointive prop-
erty, even though the donee exercises the power. 155 An exception
to the general rule, called the "Delaware tax trap," taxes the donee
of a special power on the value of the appointive property if the
donee
exercises [the] power of appointment created after October 21,
1942, by creating another power of appointment which under
the applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to post-
pone the vesting of any estate or interest in such property, or
suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of such
property, for a period ascertainable without regard to the date
of the creation of the first power. 156
This exception earned its nickname because it was enacted in re-
sponse to Delaware's statutory overrule of the doctrine of relation
back with respect to the exercise of special powers.157 Basically, it
provides that any donee of a special power who exercises that
power to create another power is taxed on the value of the ap-
pointive property unless the perpetuities period for the newly cre-
ated power begins concurrently with the perpetuities period for
151. Id.
152. I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(1),(2), 2514(a),(b) (2000). The Tax Code defines a general power as
one which can be exercised in favor of the donee, the donee's estate, the donee's creditors, or
the creditors of the donee's estate. Id. § 2041(b)(1).
153. Id. § 2041(a)(2). This rule is limited to general powers created after October 21,
1942. Id. Powers created before that date must be exercised for the value of the appointive
property to be included in the donee's gross estate. Id. § 2041(a)(1).
154. Id. § 2514(a),(b).
155. Id.
156. Id. §§ 2041(a)(3).
157. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1332-33 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501
(1989)). Delaware has subsequently repealed this statute. Id.
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the original power. In other words, the second power cannot ex-
tend the period that the appointive property is subject to contin-
gent interests.
State legislatures need to be cognizant of the Delaware tax trap
when repealing the rule against perpetuities. Simply repealing
the rule against perpetuities eliminates the perpetuities period,
making it impossible to exercise one special power to create an-
other without springing the Delaware tax trap. 158 Consequently,
a state should not repeal its rule against perpetuities without si-
multaneously legislating a way for donees of special powers to cir-
cumvent the Delaware tax trap. Failure to do so, essentially, pre-
vents the use of successive special powers of appointment.
Commentators have suggested various ways for a state to cir-
cumvent the Delaware tax trap when repealing the rule against
perpetuities. One solution is to substitute a rule against suspend-
ing the power of alienation but permit that rule to be waived so
long as the trustee has the power of sale. 159 Under this solution,
the power of alienation is never actually suspended and successive
special powers can be created indefinitely without adverse tax
consequences. 160 Another solution is to create a perpetuities pe-
riod for interests created by the exercise of a special power of ap-
pointment. 161
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania legislature repealed Pennsyl-
vania's rule against perpetuities without substituting a rule pro-
hibiting the suspension of the power of alienation or taking any
other actions to circumvent the Delaware tax trap. 162 Conse-
quently, if the donee of a special power created after December 31,
2006 exercises that power to create another power, the donee will
be subject to estate or gift tax on the value of the appointive prop-
erty.163 In addition, the exercise of a special power created prior
to January 1, 2007 to create another power will include the value
of the appointive property in the donee's gross estate unless the
doctrine of relation back subjects the new power to the rule
against perpetuities. 164
158. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1333-34.




163. I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(3), 2514(d) (2000). See also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at
1333.
164. See supra notes 111-146 and accompanying text.
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The Advisory Committee on Decedents' Estates Law has sug-
gested the adoption of the following amendment as a solution to
this problem:
If a power of appointment is exercised to create a new power
of appointment, any interest created by the exercise of the
new power of appointment is invalid if it does not vest within
360 years of the creation of the original power of appointment,
unless the exercise of the new power of appointment expressly
states that this provision shall not apply to the interests cre-
ated by the exercise. 
165
The language proposed by the Advisory Committee does not ex-
plicitly address the creation of more than one successive power.
Instead, the proposed language appears to rely on the doctrine of
relation back to write the third, fourth, or any succeeding power
back into the original power. This could cause a problem if, for
example, a perpetual trust that uses successive powers to transfer
beneficial enjoyment of the property from one generation to the
next. It could also cause problems if a court negates the doctrine
of relation back as a historical fiction. The language of the pro-
posed amendment should be altered to provide that in the event of
multiple successive powers, the 360-year period begins at the crea-
tion of the first power.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rule against perpetuities continues to serve several impor-
tant purposes and only time will tell whether repeal was beneficial
or merely the first step toward another problem. As things stand,
however, Pennsylvania's rule against perpetuities is repealed for
interests created after December 31, 2006. Although the rule has
been repealed, practitioners cannot disregard it as an anachro-
nism. Not only might they confront it in documents drafted prior
to the repeal, but, as discussed in this article, the rule, or at least
the consequences of its repeal, may impact documents drafted af-
ter the repeal.
The legislature, on the other hand, needs to revisit the repeal.
It should reconsider the effective date of the repeal and the rea-
165. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES LAWS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 20 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES: THE PROBATE,
ESTATES AND FIDUCIARIES CODE, (Oct. 2007), available at
http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/DEL%20Report%202007.pdf.
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sons, if any, for making the repeal prospective. 166 If there are no
substantial policy reasons for making the repeal prospective, the
legislature should consider making it retroactive for all interests
other than successive special powers of appointment. If the legis-
lature means for the repeal to be prospective, then it should clarify
whether, regardless of the continuing viability of the doctrine of
relation back, the rule against perpetuities continues to apply to
interests created by the exercise of special or testamentary gen-
eral powers created prior to, but exercised after, the effective date
of the repeal. If the legislature determines that the repeal should
be prospective for reasons unrelated to powers of appointment, it
might consider making the repeal applicable to all interests cre-
ated by general powers, whether testamentary or presently exer-
cisable, but it should not extend the repeal to powers of appoint-
ment created by the exercise of a special power unless it solves the
problem of the Delaware tax trap. Lastly, and most importantly,
the legislature needs to amend the current statute so that the ex-
ercise of a special power of appointment to create another power
does not fall within the Delaware tax trap. The simplest solution
to that problem is to create a lengthy perpetuities period, such as
the 320-year period suggested by the Advisory Committee, that
begins running at the exercise of the first special power and ap-
plies to interests created by all successive powers.
166. Wait-and-see was originally made prospective, 20 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.4-.5 (West
1950), and only made retroactive in 1978, 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6104(d) (West 1978). In the
interim, the Pennsylvania courts denied relief to trusts created prior to the adoption of
wait-and-see. See e.g., In re Newlin Estate, 80 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1951); In re Lovering's Estate,
96 A.2d 104 (Pa. 1951); Estate of Davis, 297 A.2d 451 (Pa. 1972). This disparate treatment
can be avoided with respect to the repeal of the rule if the Pennsylvania legislature acts
quickly to remedy the flaws in this statute.

